# MOORLI VendorRiskDiagnostic

**Audit ID:** cf73798d-90c3-4e9b-b3b4-bb1a3d5a4840 **Generated:** May 9, 2026, 12:02 AM UTC

**Plan:** EXECUTIVE **Vendors:** 1 **Client Company:** SAMPLE REPORT




Higher scores indicate stronger vendor email security across your supply chain.

A high overall score does not mean zero control failures. Review FAIL findings independently from the overall posture band.

## SECURITY POSTURE BY CATEGORY

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Spoofing** DMARC | | 94 |
| **Identity** SPF | | 94 |
| **Transport Maturity** MTA-STS / TLS-RPT adoption | | 50 |
| **Infra** MX / BIMI / DNSSEC | | 92 |

**Additional scoring signals:** This run includes 7 DKIM selector-rule observations and 4 external reputation-rule observations. DKIM selector checks and selected external reputation corroboration are included in vendor-level findings and overall risk scoring, but are not shown as standalone posture bars because DKIM selector discovery is best-effort and reputation signals are corroborative.

## RISK DISTRIBUTION

1 vendor domain

| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 domains | 0 domains | 0 domains | 1 domain |

All vendors pass baseline controls. 3 hardening opportunities were identified. The main hardening themes are DMARC policy is p=quarantine (good, but p=reject is stronger) and SPF ends in ~all (soft fail). Some receivers may still accept spoofed mail instead of rejecting it.

### Key Findings

⚠ moorli.io - SPF uses ~all (soft fail). Spoofed emails may still be accepted by some receivers instead of being rejected.

ℹ 1 of 1 vendor do not publish MTA-STS. This is a transport maturity gap, not a core control failure - industry adoption remains low. Prioritize MTA-STS for vendors handling invoices or payment instructions.

⚠ 1 of 1 vendor without DNSSEC. DNS records (including email routing) are more susceptible to tampering.

### Next 7 Days

1. **Share hardening recommendations with vendor contacts**
   `moorli.io`
2. **Schedule validation rescan to confirm remediation (recommended: 30 days)**

### Why This Matters

All vendors meet baseline security posture. The 3 warnings identified are hardening opportunities - addressing them would further reduce spoofing and interception risk across your vendor ecosystem.

*For clickable rule references, interactive filtering, and the show/hide PASS toggle, view the HTML version of this report.*

## Methodology

This assessment is performed using public DNS queries, lightweight public-web validation (for example, fetching an MTA-STS policy file when present), authoritative registration context lookups, and selected third-party reputation and threat-intelligence signals used as corroborating inputs. It does not require vendor access, authentication, or intrusive testing. Findings labeled **INFO** indicate optional or advisory controls that were not adopted or not fully configured. Findings labeled **NA** indicate that a prerequisite or source was unavailable and the check could not be deterministically evaluated. In some customer-facing

summaries, advisory-only NA findings may be displayed as INFO when the underlying condition reflects absence of an optional control rather than a source outage.

**Note on DKIM:** DKIM selectors are not predictable externally and cannot be exhaustively validated without internal configuration knowledge. Absence of a selector in this audit does not prove DKIM is not used.

# Vendor Risk Map

CRITICAL: 0 HIGH: 0 MEDIUM: 0 LOW: 1

### How Scores Work

**Risk Score** Per-vendor exposure rating (0–100). Higher means more risk. Derived from weighted FAIL/WARN findings across spoofing, identity, transport, and infrastructure controls. We weight **DMARC enforcement** heavily because it is the primary control that blocks unauthorized impersonation at the receiver.

CRITICAL ≥ 80 HIGH 60–79 MEDIUM 40–59 LOW < 40

| DOMAIN | RISK | RISK SCORE | TOP ISSUES |
|---|---|---|---|
| moorli.io | LOW | 3 | DMARC policy is p=quarantine (good, but p=reject is stronger). • SPF ends in ~all (soft fail). Some receivers may still accept spoofed mail instead of rejecting it. • DNSSEC is absent. Treat this as secondary hardening context, not a peer to DMARC/SPF enforcement failures. |

# Detailed Findings (per Domain)

Each domain begins on a new page for easy review.

## moorli.io `moorli.io`

**Findings** FAIL 0 · WARN 3 · PASS 23 · NA 16

Risk: LOW · Score: **3**

### Top Issues

DMARC policy is p=quarantine (good, but p=reject is stronger). • SPF ends in ~all (soft fail). Some receivers may still accept spoofed mail instead of rejecting it. • DNSSEC is absent. Treat this as secondary hardening context, not a peer to DMARC/SPF enforcement failures.

| STATUS | RULE | DETAILS | RECOMMENDATION |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARN | **VRD-DMARC-005** DMARC Enforcement (Spoofing Exposure) | DMARC policy is p=quarantine (good, but p=reject is stronger). | Encourage the vendor to move from p=quarantine to p=reject after they have confirmed legitimate mail is aligned. |
| WARN | **VRD-INFRA-024** Mail Infrastructure Hygiene | DNSSEC is absent. Treat this as secondary hardening context, not a peer to DMARC/SPF enforcement failures. | Ask vendor to enable DNSSEC where feasible. |
| WARN | **VRD-SPF-012** SPF Identity Controls (Sender Integrity) | SPF ends in ~all (soft fail). Some receivers may still accept spoofed mail instead of rejecting it. | Ask the vendor to converge on a single valid SPF record that ends in -all once they have confirmed all authorized senders are covered. |
| INFO | **VRD-ADV-019** Transport Security & Reporting (Maturity) | TLS-RPT is not published. Treat this as a maturity gap, not a discrete warning. | Ask vendor to publish TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls) to receive TLS failure reports. |
| INFO | **VRD-ADV-020** Transport Security & Reporting (Maturity) | MTA-STS is not adopted. Treat this as transport-maturity context, not a discrete warning. | Ask vendor to publish a valid MTA-STS TXT record and host a valid policy in testing or enforce mode. |

| STATUS | RULE | DETAILS | RECOMMENDATION |
|---|---|---|---|
| INFO | **VRD-ADV-021**<br>Transport Security & Reporting (Maturity) | No MTA-STS record; policy validation not applicable. | Ask vendor to host a valid policy at https://mta-sts./.well-known/mta-sts.txt and ensure it parses. |
| INFO | **VRD-ADV-033**<br>Transport Security & Reporting (Maturity) | No MTA-STS record; policy mode cannot be evaluated. | Ask vendor to move MTA-STS policy from 'testing' to 'enforce' once they have verified compatibility. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-026**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No common selector responded, but selector guessing alone is not enough to conclude DKIM is absent. | Treat this as inconclusive unless message headers, vendor guidance, or known selectors confirm whether DKIM signing is enabled. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-028**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record found among probed selectors; syntax check not applicable. | Treat this as inconclusive unless message headers, vendor guidance, or known selectors confirm whether DKIM signing is enabled. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-029**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record found among probed selectors; test mode check not applicable. | Treat this as inconclusive unless message headers, vendor guidance, or known selectors confirm whether DKIM signing is enabled. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-030**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record found among probed selectors; key revocation check not applicable. | Treat this as inconclusive unless message headers, vendor guidance, or known selectors confirm whether DKIM signing is enabled. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-031**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record found among probed selectors; selector count cannot be evaluated. | Informational only: vendors may use more than one selector if they want easier key rotation. |
| INFO | **VRD-DKIM-032**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record; provider cannot be identified. | Informational: Vendor appears to use a known email provider. Ensure they have enabled DKIM signing in that platform. |
| INFO | **VRD-DMARC-008**<br>DMARC Enforcement (Spoofing Exposure) | Relaxed alignment is the DMARC default. Absence of | Optional hardening only: the vendor may consider adkim=s and/or aspf=s if their mail flows support it. |

| STATUS | RULE | DETAILS | RECOMMENDATION |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | strict alignment is not, by itself, a finding. | |
| INFO | **VRD-INFRA-025**<br>Mail Infrastructure Hygiene | BIMI not detected. BIMI is optional and not a core security control. | Optional: vendor can publish BIMI (default._bimi) if they want visual brand indicators. |
| INFO | **VRD-INFRA-036**<br>Mail Infrastructure Hygiene | CAA record not detected. This is an informational hardening opportunity, not a substantive email-security finding. | Informational only: the vendor may publish CAA records to restrict which certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain. |
| NA | **VRD-DKIM-027**<br>DKIM Signing (Message Integrity) | No DKIM record found; key strength cannot be evaluated. | Use DKIM keys appropriate to the algorithm in use. For RSA, prefer 2048-bit or stronger keys. Rotate all selectors, not just the primary. |
| NA | **VRD-REP-040**<br>Domain Reputation & Risk Signals | Data unavailable for this check (missing: vendor.reputation.domainAgeDays). | Exercise caution with new vendor domains. Request additional verification of the vendor's legitimacy. |
| NA | **VRD-REP-041**<br>Domain Reputation & Risk Signals | Data unavailable for this check (missing: vendor.reputation.domainAgeDays). | Domain age is acceptable but still relatively new. Standard vendor verification procedures are recommended. |

PASS **23 checks passed — No action required**

| | |
|---|---|
| **VRD-DMARC-001** | DMARC record found |
| **VRD-DMARC-002** | DMARC syntax appears valid |
| **VRD-DMARC-003** | DMARC policy tag (p) is present and valid |
| **VRD-DMARC-004** | DMARC policy is enforcing (quarantine/reject) |
| **VRD-DMARC-006** | DMARC pct is 100% (full enforcement) or not specified |
| **VRD-DMARC-007** | DMARC subdomain tag (sp) is present or main policy is strict |
| **VRD-DMARC-009** | Aggregate reporting (rua) appears enabled |
| **VRD-DMARC-043** | Subdomain DMARC policy is not weaker than the parent policy (or inherits the parent policy) |
| **VRD-INFRA-022** | MX record detected |
| **VRD-INFRA-023** | Multiple MX hosts detected, or known cloud provider with built-in redundancy |
| **VRD-INFRA-034** | MX records point to valid hostnames |
| **VRD-INFRA-035** | MX hostname resolves to a valid IP address |
| **VRD-INFRA-037** | MX indicates use of a known secure email provider (Google, Microsoft, Proofpoint, Mimecast, etc.) |
| **VRD-REP-039** | No adverse result was returned by the selected external corroboration signal used for this check. This does not guarantee the domain is safe or risk-free |
| **VRD-REP-042** | No adverse result was returned by the selected external reputation signal used for this check. This does not guarantee the domain is safe or risk-free |
| **VRD-SPF-010** | SPF record found |
| **VRD-SPF-011** | Single SPF record detected |
| **VRD-SPF-013** | SPF lookup count is within limits (<=10) |
| **VRD-SPF-014** | No deprecated 'ptr' mechanism detected |
| **VRD-SPF-015** | No multiple redirect= directives detected |
| **VRD-SPF-016** | SPF record parsed without critical errors |
| **VRD-SPF-017** | SPF ip4/ip6 syntax appears valid |
| **VRD-SPF-018** | SPF include count is reasonable |

# Disclaimer

**MOORLI VendorRiskDiagnostic** is an automated intelligence service provided by **MOORLI LLC** that evaluates the **public email security configuration** of internet domains. The risk scores, grades, and remediation recommendations in this report are generated by software algorithms using **external, non-intrusive analysis of public technical signals** and are provided solely for **informational and educational purposes**.

**External, non-intrusive analysis only.** This Service analyzes publicly available DNS records, lightweight public-web signals, authoritative registration context, and selected third-party reputation and threat-intelligence signals used as corroborating inputs. We do not send test emails, attempt authentication, access vendor systems, conduct penetration testing, or perform intrusive security testing of any kind.

**Provider-agnostic.** This Service is intended to be provider-agnostic and focuses on a domain's observable, publicly published configuration (e.g., SPF/DMARC/MTA-STS/DNSSEC). We do not provide opinions about, endorse, or certify any email service provider, DNS host, or cloud vendor. Any third-party product or brand names referenced are the property of their respective owners and are used only for identification.

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